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INTRODUCTION
For the citizens of most States, election day entails traveling to a
polling place, waiting in line, registering, marking a ballot in a voting
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booth, and then placing the marked ballot in a large slotted box.' In
Estonia, however, voters have exchanged their paper ballots and
voting booths for mouse clicks, networked computers, and the
comfort of their own homes.2 In this small Baltic country, the
Internet has finally invaded one of the holdouts of an increasingly
wired world.3
Although several States have conducted pilot Internet elections4 or
requested a report on the subject in the past several years,5 most
States have decided that the possible benefits of holding elections
over the Internet6 do not outweighed the perceived risks.7 This
1. Cf Pamela A. Stone, Comment, Electronic Ballot Boxes: Legal Obstacles
to Voting Over the Internet, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 953, 958-59 (1998) (describing
the traditional method of voting in the United States).
2. See Sarah Left, Estonia Set For Online Elections, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED,
Mar. 28, 2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/mar/28/intemetnews
(reporting on the Estonian government's announcement to hold online elections).
3. Cf Stone, supra note 1, at 955 (contemplating the legal and social obstacles
to establishing Internet voting in the United States).
4. See Thomas Buchsbaum, Head of Expatriates Div. of the Fed. Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Austria, Remarks at the OSCE Supplementary Human
Dimension Meeting, in CHALLENGES OF ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND
PROCEDURES: SUPPLEMENTARY HUMAN DIMENSION MEETING FINAL REPORT 36
(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Apr. 21-22, 2005),
available at http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/elections-and-technology/Challenge
s%20of/o20ElectionTechnologies%20and%20Procedures.pdf [hereinafter OSCE
ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES REPORT] (noting that England, Switzerland, France,
Spain and the Netherlands have also implemented Internet voting pilot programs);
see also R6publique et Canton de Gen~ve [Republic and Canton of Geneva], The
Geneva Internet Voting System, http://www.geneve.ch/evoting/english/present
ation-projet.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Rdpublique et Canton de
Gen~ve] (reporting on an Internet voting project launched by the Geneva State
Council in March 2001, which resulted in the first Internet election in Switzerland
in January 2003).
5. See, e.g., NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV'T AND REG'L DEV.,
ELECTRONIC VOTING - CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 8-13 (2006) [hereinafter
NORWEGIAN MINISTRY], available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/krd
/red/2006/0087/ddd/pdfv/298587-evalg-rapportengelsk201106.pdf (reporting the
Norwegian government's findings on the potential use and implementation of
Internet voting); see also CAL. INTERNET VOTING TASK FORCE, A REPORT ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF INTERNET VOTING 1-6 (2000), available at http://www.
ss.ca.gov/executive/ivote/ [hereinafter CAL. TASK FORCE] (finding that further
technical developments would be necessary before the state of California could
implement a secure Internet voting system).
6. See Jeno Szep, Adviser, Ass'n of Cent. & E. Eur. Election Officials,
Remarks at the OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting, in OSCE
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conclusion has forced States to abandon their plans to implement
Internet voting on a large scale,8 making Estonia's Internet voting
system an anomaly. 9 As of Spring 2007, Estonia had held two
binding elections where voters could cast their ballots over the
Internet-the first were local elections held in October 2005 and the
second were the Parliamentary elections of March 2007.10
ELECTION TECHNOLOGIES REPORT, supra note 4, at 31 (commenting that Internet
voting "reflects modem lifestyle"). Internet voting is fast, reliable, and makes
voting easier for citizens who are abroad, live far from voting stations, or are
disabled. See id.
7. See ROBERT S. DONE, INTERNET VOTING: BRINGING ELECTIONS TO THE
DESKTOP 18-22 (2002), available at http://www.businessofgovemment.org/
pdfs/DoneReport.pdf (analyzing the technological, legal, and social issues that
governments must resolve before implementing Internet voting); John Schwartz,
E-voting: Its Day Has Not Come Just Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at C I
(reporting on the difficulties faced by the Internet voting company that piloted
Internet elections in California). Some computer scientists believe that Internet
elections are inherently problematic and that the security issues faced by Internet
elections could lead to public distrust of the system, which could in turn "threaten
democratic society." See id.
8. See Thomas M. Buchsbaum, E-Voting: International Developments and
Lessons Learnt, in ELECTRONIC VOTING IN EUROPE: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, POLITICS
AND SOCIETY 31, 41 (Alexander Prosser & Robert Krimmer eds., 2004), available
at http://static.twoday.net/evoting/files/E-Voting-in-Europe-Proceedings.pdf
[hereinafter Buchsbaum, E-Voting] (expressing skepticism regarding the progress
of Internet voting and pointing out that states seeking to implement Internet
elections have significant obstacles to overcome in the areas of law, politics, and
technology). But see Ian Urbina, Casting a Ballot Overseas Is Sometimes No Sure
Bet, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2007, at A19 (describing the U.S. Department of
Defense expenditure of over thirty million dollars on the development of web-
based voting systems for soldiers abroad because the traditional paper ballot
system had been so ineffective).
9. See Wolfgang Drechsler, Dispatch From The Future, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2006, at B1 (explaining that Estonia's accomplishment in becoming the world's
first country to have binding online national elections was rooted in the
government's focus on becoming a leader in Internet-based services). Estonians are
known to pay their parking tickets via cell phones and submit their taxes online.
See id.
10. See David Mardiste, Estonia To Hold First National Internet Election,
REUTERS, Feb. 21, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSL
213415120070221 (reporting that 10,000 citizens voted over the Internet in
Estonia's October 2005 local elections); Estonian National Election Committee,
Parliamentary Elections: Election Day Turn-Out (2007), http://www.vvk.ee
/r07/paeveng.stm# (presenting the preliminary voter turn-out results of the March
2007 Parliamentary election, in which three percent of voters chose to vote via the
Internet).
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This Comment argues that Internet elections in Estonia comply
with the standards set out in the United Nations Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). 1' Part I describes three requirements
of the ICCPR for elections: secret ballot, equal suffrage, and
auditability. Part I also describes the legal framework governing
elections in Estonia as well as the country's procedures for Internet
voting. Part II demonstrates that Estonia's laws and voting
procedures create an Internet elections framework that complies with
the requirements of the ICCPR. Part III provides three
recommendations. First, the United Nations should create an optional
protocol for the ICCPR that provides guidelines for Internet
elections. Second, Estonia should amend its election laws and
prohibit Internet voting at the work place. Third and finally, the
Estonian government should create a list of tasks for observers of its
Internet elections. This Comment concludes by suggesting that other
States look to Estonia as a model when developing the legal
framework for Internet elections.
I. BACKGROUND
Estonia's parliament, the Riigikogu, established a legal framework
for Internet voting by passing a set of election laws in 2002 and
amendments thereto in 2005.12 Initially there was some political
resistance to the scheme from two political parties in the Riigikogu,13
both of which opposed the Internet voting provisions because of
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916
U.S.T. 521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. See OLLE MADISE ET AL., INTERNET VOTING AT THE ELECTIONS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COUNCILS ON OCTOBER 2005 13-15 (2006), available at
http://www.vvk.ee/english/report2006.pdf (presenting a chronology of the Internet
voting legislation from their initial drafts on April 30, 2001, to entry into Estonia's
legal system on September 18, 2005, including debates and subsequent changes
made to the legislation).
13. See OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INST. & HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS 4 MARCH 2007: OSCE/ODIHR NEEDS ASSESSMENT MISSION REPORT 6
(2007), available at http://wwwI.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/01/2313 l-en.pdf
[hereinafter NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT] (reporting that the Estonian People's
Union and the Estonian Centre Party-both of whom were members of the
Government coalition-opposed the Internet voting system primarily out practical
concerns as opposed to general opposition).
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concerns that voters would not be able to vote secret ballots, that
observers could not audit the Internet election, and that voters could
face coercion.1 4 President Arnold Rifitel then refused to promulgate
the legislation because he believed that Internet voting was
unconstitutional. 5 President Rifitel was of the view that the
possibility to change one's Internet vote during the period of
advanced polling1 6 gave voters an advantage over those that attended
traditional polling stations and thus violated the constitutional
provision of uniformity in elections. 7 The Supreme Court of Estonia
subsequently reviewed the legislation, held that it was constitutional,
and ordered the President to promulgate it. 8
Estonia introduced Internet voting in stages. Estonia held its first
pilot Internet election in January 2005.19 Ten months later, in
October 2005, Estonia held municipal elections in the city of Tallinn
and gave voters the opportunity to cast ballots over the Internet.2 °
14. See id. (noting that while different political parties balanced the risks and
benefits of Internet voting differently, none registered concerns regarding the
fundamental security of the system).
15. See id. at 5 (explaining that although the President challenged the
legislation in the Estonian Supreme Court, no other legal challenges were made to
the Internet voting amendment).
16. See Riigikohus [Supreme Court], Judgment of the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court, Petition of the President of the Republic to
Declare the Local Government Council Election Act Amendment Act, Passed by
the Riigikogu on 28 June 2005, Unconstitutional, Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-
13-05, 2, Sept. 1, 2005 (Est.) (finding that Internet voters have the ability to
change their vote an unlimited number of times prior to the close of polls on the
day of voting).
17. See EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS [Constitution] § 156 (Est.) ("[E]lections
shall be general, uniform and direct.").
18. See Riigikohus [Supreme Court], Judgment of the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-13-05, 30-32
(balancing the "electoral principles arising from the Constitution" and holding that
the ability of Internet voters to change their vote is necessary to guarantee free
elections).
19. See Thumbs up for Online Voting, COMPUTING, June 2, 2005, at 5 (noting
that Estonia's successful pilot Internet elections led to the use of online voting in
the city elections of Tallinn in October 2005).
20. See Drechsler, supra note 9, at B 1 (examining the success of the October
2005 election in light of the small proportion of voters that used Internet voting);
see also Epp Maaten, PowerPoint Presentation, Estonia 2005: The First Practice Of
Internet Voting, Meeting to Review Developments in the Field of E-Voting in
Strasbourg, F.R.G. (Nov. 23, 2006), available at http://www.coe.int
/t/e/integrated-projects/democracy/EVoting/PPT%20MAATEN.ppt (reporting that
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Two years after that, Estonia held a national election for Parliament
in March 2007, which also included an option for Internet voting.2'
In a pre-election review of Estonia's electoral system, the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe ("OSCE")
concluded that "[t]he legal framework of Estonia overall provides for
the conduct of democratic elections. '22 Although the OSCE is one of
the few organizations that has released an official report on the
March 2007 election,23 media reports were positive about the election
and in particular the success of Internet voting.24 The OSCE report
noted that, while Internet voting appeared to have functioned well
during the election, there are still risks to the integrity of the system
and the government should improve its auditing efforts.
Holding Internet elections was a logical step for Estonia. Estonians
have integrated the Internet into their lives to such an extent that they
even utilize the Internet for routine matters such as personal banking
although eighty percent of voters had the opportunity to vote over the Internet in
the October 2005 election, only one percent did so).
21. See Mardiste, supra note 10 (reporting on the preparations taken prior to
the March 4, 2007 parliamentary election).
22. NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. The OSCE generally felt
that Estonia's prior elections had been successful but pointed out areas in need of
improvement, such as participation of minorities. See id. at 3, 9-10. The OSCE
recommended sending an Elections Assessment Mission to Estonia two weeks
prior to the election. Id. at 2.
23. See OFFICE OF DEMOCRATIC INST. & HUMAN RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR
SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, REPUBLIC OF ESTONIA PARLIAMENTARY
ELECTIONS 4 MARCH 2007: OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION ASSESSMENT MISSION
REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007
/07/25385_.en.pdf [hereinafter ELECTION MISSION REPORT] (describing the
approval of the conduct of the election and the level of confidence that the
government and people had in it).
24. See John Borland, Online Voting Clicks in Estonia, WIRED, Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/03/72846 (reporting that the
percentage of votes cast via Internet voters exceeded Estonian officials'
expectations); Julie Ray, "E-stonians" E-Vote, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 2,
2007, http://www.gallup.com/poll/26767/Estonians-EVote.aspx (suggesting that
Internet voting may positively affect the level of confidence that Estonians have in
their election); see also Estonia Embraces E-Voting, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2007,
http://www.reuters.com/news/video/videoStory?videold=18103 (presenting
interviews with several voters who cast their ballots online in the March 2007
elections).
25. See ELECTION MISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1-2, 9 (stating that while
the electorate tends to be comfortable with the Internet voting system, "testing and
auditing of the system could have been more comprehensive").
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transactions. 26 The government has made the implementation of
technology a high priority as well.27 Estonia has thus emerged from
its post-Communist economy as a technology powerhouse.28 Indeed,
its preeminence as an Internet pioneer was recently brought to the
world spotlight when a large-scale cyber attack forced many of its
government and banking websites to shut down.29
A. ESTONIAN INTERNET ELECTION VOTING PROCESS
Internet voting is only a supplementary means of voting in
Estonia.3" Other forms of voting are still available for all voters,
including voting at polling places, voting early at designated sites, or
voting at home.3' The legislation that provides for online voting
contains certain technology requirements, including possession of a
computer with access to the Internet, an ID card reader,32 an ID
26. See The Wired World of E-stonia, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 2002, at 17
(underscoring the fact that almost ninety percent of banking transactions in Estonia
take place over the Internet or through special security-enabled cellular phones).
27. See id. at 17 (describing that Estonian lawmakers use specially designed
computer programs to amend and comment on proposed legislation, which saves
paper and time). Estonia has gone to the extent of posting roadside signs to direct
citizens to the nearest Internet locations. Id. One reporter recently considered the
Internet in Estonia to be as "vital as running water." See Mark Landler & John
Markoff, Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?n=Top/
News/World/Countries%20and%20Territories/Estonia.
28. See Mark Landler, The Baltic Life: Chilly Streets and Hot Technology in
Estonia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at Cl (reporting on the number of successful
technology companies based in Estonia, including Skype, which offers free Voice
Over Internet Protocol technology).
29. See Mark Landler & John Markoff, After Computer Siege in Estonia, War
Fears Turn To Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2007, at Al (describing the
recent attacks on Estonian websites and assessments of the security threat the
attacks pose).
30. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 §§ 34, 44, 46 (2002)
(Est.) (providing home voting, electronic voting, and voting in a polling place as
voting options); see also Local Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36,
220, ch. 7 §§ 40, 50, 52 (2002) (Est.); Eur. Par. Election Act, RT I 2003, 4, 22,
ch. 7 §§ 33, 43, 45 (2003) (Est.).
31. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch.7 §§ 43(1), 46(1)
(providing that a voter may vote at home or at a polling place other than that of
their polling division "due to his or her state of health or for another good reason");
see also Local Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7
§§ 49(1), 52(1); Eur. Parl. Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, at ch. 7 §§ 42(1), 45(1).
32. See Borland, supra note 24 (describing that before the March 2007
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card, 3  and the appropriate software. 4 Voting takes place on the
website of the Estonian National Election Committee ("NEC").3 5
The Estonian government designed the Internet voting procedures
to mimic the normal paper ballot voting process used when voters
are not voting in their residential district.3 6 A voter inserts her
marked ballot into a small envelope, which she then places inside a
larger envelope bearing her signature.3 7 At the end of the election,
election officials open the outside envelopes and separate them from
the smaller envelopes.3" This process prevents another party from
ever connecting a voter back to their cast ballot, while at the same
time providing proof of which voters voted. 9
The first step in the Internet voting process is for voters to log onto
the NEC website, place their ID card in the ID card reader attached
to their computer, and log in securely using a Personal Identification
Number ("PIN"). 40 Voters then go through the different screens for
election, banks in Estonia were handing out ID card readers for free to individuals
applying for the bank's e-banking services, or alternatively voters could purchase
the card readers for eight dollars); About 1% of Votes Cast Online in Estonian
Local Elections, Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.epractice.eu/document/710 (noting that
because some Estonians had not purchased the ID card reader, the government
made computers with the card readers available in public areas such as banks,
telecommunications offices, and government buildings).
33. See MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, at 8-10 (maintaining that the ID card is
an important part of the design of the Internet election system because it allows for
a secure transaction). The security features of the card include a machine-readable
code printed on the outside of the card, a microchip containing data regarding the
cardholder, and two security certificates. Id. See also Estonian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, E-Estonia, Sept. 20, 2007, http://www.vm.ee/estonia/kat 175/pea175
/1 163.htmi (reporting that as of September 2007, Estonia has distributed over
900,000 ID cards, which includes most eligible voters).
34. See Drechsler, supra note 9, at B I (reporting that the ID card reader
requires software that is complicated to install on personal computers).
35. See NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, E-VOTING SYSTEM OVERVIEW 6
(2005), available at http://www.vvk.ee/elektr/docs/Yldkirjeldus-eng.pdf.
36. See MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, at 22.
37. See id. at 22-25.
38. See id.
39. See id. (explaining that this method has been successful in keeping the
voter's identity confidential and allowing election officials to properly calculate
the votes).
40. See Heiki Sibul, Chairman of the Nat'l Election Comm. (Est.), PowerPoint
Presentation: Towards Remote E-Voting: Estonian Case, Slides 11-15 (4th Quality
Conference for Public Administrations in the EU) (2006), available at
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each office and select their candidates. The voting software encrypts
the cast ballot to prevent a third party from ascertaining for whom
the voter voted.4 The voters then cast their ballot electronically,4 2
after confirming their choices and entering a second PIN. 43 The voter
completes the ballot with his digital signature, which is part of the ID
card.44 The use of the digital signature during Internet voting is thus
analogous to the voter's signature on the outer envelope in paper
ballot voting.45
At the end of the election, election officials must count the
electronic ballots and add them to the paper ballot tally.46 In order to
accomplish this, the voting software first separates the encrypted
ballot from the digital signature of the voter.47 The separation process
ensures that a third party cannot later connect a voter with her cast
ballot and it preserves a record indicating which voters cast ballots
electronically. 48 At the end of the process, election officials will have
http://www.4qconference.org/liitetiedostot/bp-esitykset/EstoniaB.pdf (providing
details about the Internet voting process and showing images of how the process
appears on a voter's computer screen).
41. See generally NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 8-11
(giving an overview of the Internet voting process and a description of the
computer components involved in making the system work).
42. See Borland, supra note 24 (describing the way in which the electronic vote
is relayed through a series of servers, creating a record of the vote after a voter
casts his ballot electronically).
43. See Ina Rottscheidt, Estonia's E-Lection Voting Begins With Doubts Over
Security, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Mar. 4, 2007, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article
/0,2144,2372334,00.html (explaining that the Estonian government also uses the
PIN numbers for other secure online activities, including shopping and tax
returns).
44. See Epp Maaten, Towards Remote E- Voting: Estonian Case in ELECTRONIC
VOTING IN EUROPE: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at
87 (explaining the encryption of voters' ballots and the required digital signature).
45. Cf MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, at 8-9 (describing the Digital Signature
Act, RT 1 2000, 26, 150, § 3(1) (2000) (Est.), which provides that digital signatures
may be applied in lieu of hand-written signatures).
46. See NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 14-16 (explaining
the process election officials use to tally Internet votes and cancel multiple
conflicting votes).
47. See id. at 15 (stating the technical procedure for separating the encrypted
ballots from the digital signatures); Schwartz, supra note 8, at CI (describing the
difficulty of auditing ballots while also maintaining their secrecy).
48. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 87 (explaining that voter privacy is protected
by two encryption points in the voting process whereby one key encrypts voters'
ballots and a second key possessed by the National Electoral Committee decrypts
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two separate sets of information-a vote tally and a list of voters
who voted electronically.
Election officials next compare the lists of voters who voted
electronically and those who voted a normal paper ballot to ensure
that no one has voted multiple times.4 9 If there are any names that
appear on both lists, officials go through a process to delete the vote
cast electronically. 5 This process ensures that no voter has the
opportunity to cast more than one ballot.
B. ESTONIAN ELECTION LAWS
Estonia has three primary pieces of legislation that govern the
conduct of Internet elections: the Riigikogu Election Act,5 the Local
Government Council Election Act,52 and the European Parliament
Election Act,53 (collectively, "Acts"). The Riigikogu amended the
Acts to allow Internet voting as a voting option 54 by specifying that
Internet voting can take place between the sixth and fourth day prior
to election day and that voting can take place at all hours during this
time.55 The Acts require voters to vote on their own behalf and
the ballots). To protect voter privacy, at no time should a single party possess both
keys. Id.; see Triinu Mdgi, Practical Analysis of E-voting Systems 30 (2007)
(unpublished Masters thesis, Tallinn University of Technology), http://triinu.net/e-
voting/master%20thesis%20e-voting%20security.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2007)
(comparing the Estonian Internet voting system with the U.S. pilot Internet voting
process-the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment ("SERVE")-
and concluding that the Estonian system is more secure, mainly because the
Estonian system employs the decryption and encryption method).
49. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 88 (describing how electronic voter lists are
sent to the local polling stations making it easy for election officials to determine if
any voters voted both at the polling place and over the Internet).
50. See generally NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 14-15
(describing the several steps that take place before votes are cancelled and
explaining that the NEC makes the final decisions about canceling votes).
51. Riigikogu Election Act, RT 1 2002, 57, 355.
52. Local Government Council Election Act, RT 1 2002, 36, 220.
53. Eur. Parl. Election Act, RT I 2003, 4, 22.
54. See MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, at 13-15 (providing a chronological list
of the debates held in the Riigikogu regarding the Internet voting amendments).
55. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT 1 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 38; Local
Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 44; Eur. Pari.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 37.
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specify that only those voters who hold a digital signature certificate
may vote electronically.5 6
The Acts also set out the framework for Internet voting.57 The Acts
state that a voter must first verify his or her identity using the digital
signature on the ID card, then confirm their electoral district, and
finally cast their ballot.58 The Acts also provide for receipt by the
voter of official notification that indicates that they have cast their
ballot successfully. 5
9
Estonia's Constitution contains provisions regarding voting as
well.60 Although the Estonian Constitution does not specifically
mention Internet voting, it does state that elections must be "general,
uniform and direct. '61 The Constitution also provides for the secret
ballot.
62
C. ESTONIAN CRIMINAL LAW PERTAINING TO ELECTIONS
The Estonian Penal Code has a broad set of criminal provisions
relating to elections. The Penal Code prohibits interfering with
voting and utilizing violence or taking advantage of a relationship to
influence how another person votes.63 Criminal laws also prohibit
anyone from violating the confidentiality of the secret ballot64 or
56. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 85 (stating that ID cards provide the digital
signature for Internet voting and that this is a unique approach to voter
identification in Internet elections).
57. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 44; Local
Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50; Eur. Par.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 43.
58. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 44(l)-(4); Local
Government Council Election Act, RT 1 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50(1)-(4); Eur. Parl.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 43(l)-(4).
59. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 44(5); Local
Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50(5); Eur. Parl.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 43(5).
60. See EESTI VABARIIGI POHISEADUS §§ 57, 60, 156.
61. See id. §§60, 156.
62. See id.
63. See PENAL CODE § 162 (2001, as amended 2007) (Est.), available at
http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=5 7&lid=2240&less-false
(providing fines and/or imprisonment for individuals who inhibit others from
exercising their right to vote).
64. See id. § 166 (providing punishment by fine or detention for violations of
secret ballot procedures).
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employing bribery to induce someone to vote, not vote, or vote in a
certain way.61
D. ICCPR REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTIONS
There are no binding international laws governing Internet
elections,66 but there are international standards for paper ballot
elections.67 The ICCPR is an important standard of this nature,
containing specific guidelines and requirements for elections 68 that
are made binding on States that sign or ratify the ICCPR.69 The
United Nations Human Rights Committee ("UN HRC"), which
oversees the implementation of the ICCPR, has not made any
recommendations on the specific type of voting system that a State
should implement, but supports any electoral framework that
conforms to the principles contained in the ICCPR.7 °
65. See id. § 164 (prohibiting bribery with the intention of influencing
someone's vote).
66. See Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Legal, Operational and Technical
Standards for E-Voting 23-29 (2004), available at http://www.coe.int/t/e
/integrated-projects/democracy/02_activities/02_e%2Dvoting/0 1_recommendation
/Rec(2004)l1 _EngEvoting-andExplMemo.pdf [hereinafter Operational and
Technical Standards for E-Voting] (summarizing the European Union's support of
Internet elections and suggesting guidelines for e-voting); Buchsbaum, E- Voting,
supra note 8, at 38 (suggesting that the Council of Europe is a leader in the
development of standards for Internet voting and explaining the process through
which the Council of Europe developed those standards).
67. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 11.
68. See id. art. 25 (declaring that every citizen shall have the right to vote by
secret ballot in genuine elections with universal, equal suffrage and a guarantee of
free expression).
69. See Christopher Harland, The Status of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial
Global Survey Through UN Human Rights Committee Documents, 22.1 HuM. RTS.
Q. 187, 188 (2000) (advocating the use of the binding provisions of the ICCPR to
enhance domestic democratic rights in states parties to the ICCPR); see also
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 4 (2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (providing a
country-by-country status report on ratification of various international human
rights instruments, including the ICCPR). Estonia ratified the ICCPR on January
21, 1992. Id.
70. See U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 25: The Right to
Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and The Right of Equal Access to
Public Service (Art. 25), 1, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, (Dec. 7,
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1. Secrecy lf the Voting Process
ICCPR Article 25 requires that each voter have the opportunity to
vote a secret ballot,7 echoing similar principles incorporated into
other international standards.72 Two primary reasons support keeping
the voting process secret-ensuring that voters are free from undue
influence when casting their vote and ensuring the right of voters to
cast their ballots in private.73 Almost all democratic States adhere to
this principle.74 There are a variety of ways in which States protect
the secret ballot. Many States have requirements that voters enter
polling booths alone and many States penalize individuals that reveal
how a voter voted.7 5 UN HRC has interpreted Article 25 as imposing
1996) [hereinafter General Comment No. 25] ("Article 25 lies at the core of
democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with
the principles of the Covenant."); see also SCOTT N. CARLSON & GREGORY
GISVOLD, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 148 (Transnational Publishers 2003) (suggesting that the
ICCPR does not mandate any particular type of electoral system so long as the
electoral system conforms to the basic democratic principles of Article 25 of the
ICCPR).
71. ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 25.
72. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 21, 3,
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (stating
that elections "shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent voting procedures.");
Council of Eur., Eur. Comm'n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Draft Convention on Election Standards, Electoral Rights, and Freedoms art. 11,
Doc. No. CDL(2003)57 (Sept. 11, 2003) (declaring that "(1) The rights of citizens
to secret voting shall not be restricted or infringed in any way; (2) Elections shall
be held by secret voting that ensures free and secret expression of the voter's will;
and (3) Observance of the principle of secret and free voting in the forms
established by law means the exclusion of any kind of control whatsoever over the
expression of voters' will, as well as the provision of equal legal conditions for
making a free choice between candidates, lists of candidates, or political parties
(coalitions)").
73. See BOB WATT, IMPLEMENTING ELECTRONIC VOTING IN THE UK: THE
LEGAL ISSUES 21 (document unpaginated) (2002), available at http://www.
communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovemment/pdf/155373 (evaluating in the
light of international human rights instruments a set of proposed UK statutes that
would provide for electronic voting).
74. See, e.g., CARLSON & GISVOLD, supra note 70, at 151 (observing that when
the States Parties drafted the ICCPR, the inclusion of the secret ballot requirement
did not meet as much opposition as other electoral requirements).
75. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE (IDEA), INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR
REVIEWING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTIONS 71 (2002), available at
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an affirmative obligation on States to protect voters from such
76coercion.
Voter coercion or undue influence generally can arise at two
different times during the voting process: as the voter is voting and
after the voter has cast his ballot.77 Voter coercion that transpires as a
voter is casting a ballot is unique to voting that takes place outside of
the polling place, such as absentee voting or voting over the
Internet.78 In such a situation, there is a danger that another person
might vote someone else's ballot or make the voter cast their vote in
a specific way.79 Illicit influencing of voters can also take place when
a voter believes that he or she may face consequences for voting a
particular way and the voter does not trust that the election officials
or voting technology will keep his vote confidential.8" In this
situation, a voter is likely to succumb to another party's influence
over his voting decision.81
http://www.idea.int/publications/ies/upload/ 12.%2OBalloting.pdf [hereinafter
IDEA GUIDELINES] (emphasizing the importance of voter privacy and providing
suggestions of how states can comply, such as requiring voters to go into a voting
booth by themselves and that no one except a voter should handle their marked
ballot until election officials open ballot boxes).
76. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 70, 20 (explaining that a state's
duty to prevent coercion extends to voters casting absentee ballots); see also ALEX
CONTE ET AL., DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 71 (Ashgate Publishing
2004) (asserting that the ICCPR imposes affirmative obligations on states to allow
citizens to exercise the right to vote).
77. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY, supra note 5, at 46 (noting that secrecy serves two
important functions: protecting the voter's privacy as the vote is cast, and
preventing any trace between the voter and his or her vote once the ballot has been
cast).
78. See Allison A. Stacker, Comment, Cyber-Elections and the Minority Voters
Response, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 475, 480 (2003) (contending that removing voting
from the public sphere creates increased security and privacy risks).
79. See WATT, supra note 73, at 13-15 (discussing provisions to deter voter
coercion under UK law and analyzing the effectiveness of techniques preventing
such coercion under circumstances of in-person, postal, and electronic voting).
80. See Norwegian Ministry, supra note 5, at 46-47 (providing an explanation
of the importance of secret suffrage and stating that ensuring ballot secrecy deters
buying and selling of votes).
81. See FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, VOTING OVER THE INTERNET PILOT PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT 4-32
(2001), available at http://www. fvap.gov/services/voireport.pdf [hereinafter DOD
E-VOTING ASSESSMENT] (noting that with commercially available software a
person could determine how another person voted, which could be used as
verification in a vote-buying scheme).
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2. Equal Suffrage
Equal suffrage is another requirement of the ICCPR.82 A basic
interpretation of this standard is that each person only has one vote to
cast.83 Another interpretation holds that equal suffrage under Article
25(b) requires that all voters' votes count equally.14 UN HRC
requires that the election procedures and laws of States Parties
comply with both interpretations of the equal suffrage principle.
In the context of voting procedures, the presence of multiple
methods of casting one's ballot cannot cause one group in society to
have an unfair advantage over another group. 6 Voting methods can
be particularly difficult to analyze because there are a variety of
factors that can make methods unequal-from the amount of time a
person has to cast their ballot, to the technology needed to vote, to
the ability for a person with a disability to vote.87 The crucial inquiry,
then, is to determine whether the aggregate impact of a particular
method of voting disadvantages any particular group.88 Article 289 of
82. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 70, 21 (noting that a State Party
must ensure that its electoral system makes each voter's vote equal to that of other
voters).
83. See Pierre Garrone, Fundamental and Political Rights in Electronic
Elections, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND E-VOTING 113 (Alexander H. Trechsel &
Fernando Mendez eds., 2005) (explaining that in an Internet election the one-
person, one-vote standard is more complex than in normal elections). Because of
the need for election officials to audit who voted in an election, a voter cannot be
completely anonymous in the process. Id.
84. See CONTE ET AL., supra note 76, at 73 (2004) (reporting that the HRC
applied this standard in a complaint where the drawing of electoral boundaries had
caused an inequality for voters).
85. See id.
86. See Stacker, supra note 78, at 476, 482-85 (analyzing Internet elections
under the United States Voting Rights Act provisions which prohibit dilution of
minority votes and electoral processes that might reduce participation in elections
and concluding that Internet elections could violate these regulations because of
the digital divide, which is used to describe the inequality in technology that exists
between different groups in society).
87. IDEA GUIDELINES, supra note 75, at 72-3 (noting that voting procedures
should be able to adapt to changes in technology, voting methods, and other
population-specific factors, such as physically disabled voters).
88. See CONTE ET AL., supra note 76, at 73 (pointing out that states must also
ensure that the method of allocating votes does not limit the right of any particular
group to select their representatives in an election).
89. See ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 2.
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the ICCPR supports this rationale because it requires that States
Parties to the ICCPR ensure that they apply the rights guaranteed in
the ICCPR "without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status." 90
3. Auditability
ICCPR Article 2591 requires that States Parties' electoral processes
have a built-in auditing mechanism. 92 With elections based upon the
normal paper ballot, observers or independent government agencies
usually conduct auditing. 93 Observers' tasks can include monitoring
the counting of ballots, testing voting equipment, and observing
voting at polling stations. 94 The role of observers and their reports
play an important part in determining if an election has met
international standards 95 and developing public trust in the election
90. See id.
91. See id. art. 25.
92. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 70, 20 ("[T]here should be
independent scrutiny of the voting and counting process ....").
93. See Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and
Code of Conduct for International Election Observers 1 (Oct. 27, 2005), available
at http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2231 .pdf [hereinafter Declaration of
Principles] (stating that international election observers must be impartial and
should judge elections based on both the domestic law of the country in which the
election is being held as well as "international principles for genuine democratic
elections"). The Declaration of Principles define election observation as "the
systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning the
laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors
concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional
analysis of such information; and the drawing of conclusions about the character of
electoral processes based on the highest standards for accuracy of information and
impartiality of analysis." See id. at 2, 4. See also ACE Electoral Knowledge
Network, Monitors of Electoral Integrity (Sept. 8, 2006), http://aceproject.org/ace-
en/topics/ei/eid/default (listing specific tasks for effective election monitoring,
which include assessing the legal framework, the freedom of assembly and
movement, the counting of ballots, and whether there are processes in place by
which a citizen can submit a complaint about the election).
94. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 93, at 5, 14 (explaining that
election observers should be involved in an election from the pre-election period
through the post-election period).
95. See KARE VOLLAN, OBSERVING ELECTRONIC VOTING 3 (Norwegian Centre
for Human Rights 2005), available at http://www.humanrights.uio.no/
forskning/publ/nr/2005/1505.pdf (explaining that a host state can use election
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process.96 Auditability can also include the incorporation of
procedures that make the voting process more transparent and allow
third parties to verify the voting equipment and vote count.97
II. ANALYSIS
Internet elections must adhere to the same requirements of secret
ballot, equal suffrage, and auditability that are provided in the
ICCPR for normal paper ballot elections.98 Estonia's Internet
elections do not run afoul of ICCPR Article 25 because Estonia's
election procedures, electoral laws, and penal code provide a
framework that adheres to the principles in the ICCPR as that
instrument is interpreted by UN HRC. 99 As other states move
observers' reports as a guide for improving future elections, or the that
international community can use the reports as evidence that a state's government
is impeding democratic elections); CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY & THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE CALTECH/MIT
VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT 44 (2001), available at http://web.mit.edu
/newsoffice/nr/2001/VTP-report-all.pdf [hereinafter CALTECH/MIT REPORT]
(emphasizing the importance of observers at an election, and reporting that
observers in Boston in the Massachusetts 2000 general election were able to catch
an error in vote calculation that resulted in 30,000 invalid votes for at least one
item on the ballot).
96. See Szep, supra note 6, at 32 (declaring that public confidence in the
election system is vital and that transparency in the system is a major factor in
gaining public confidence); see also Tim Bittinger, Innovative Technology and its
Impact on the Electoral Process, in VOTER TURNOUT IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE
1945: A REGIONAL REPORT 37, 39-40 (International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance 2004), available at http://www.idea.int/publications/voter_
turnoutweurope/upload/FullReprot.pdf (noting that some experts believe that
public confidence in the Internet is the main problem with an Internet voting
system).
97. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 93, at 4 (describing the conditions
for ensuring that an international election observation mission is credible,
including the provision to observers of unimpeded access to all stages of the
election process and the technology being used).
98. See Micheal Remmert, Towards European Voting Standards on Electronic
Voting, in ELECTRONIC VOTING IN EUROPE: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 13 (reporting that the Council of Europe set up the
Multidisciplinary Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on legal, operational and technical
aspects of e-voting to create standards for e-voting that comply with fundamental
standards of elections).
99. See CONTE ET AL., supra note 76, at 73 (reporting that de Clippel v.
Belgium was the only complaint lodged with UN HRC in which a complainant
alleged that automated vote-counting breached ICCPR Article 25(b)). UN HRC
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forward and create the legal framework for Internet elections they
should look to Estonia as a model. 0
A. ESTONIAN INTERNET ELECTIONS COMPLY WITH THE ICCPR
SECRET BALLOT REQUIREMENT
Estonia is able to comply with the ICCPR secret ballot
requirement through a combination of its election laws, penal code,
and the design of its Internet voting procedures. Most importantly,
the Estonian Constitution and Estonian election Laws create a strong
legal framework because they both state that elections must be
secret.' 0 1 Because Internet voting takes place in an environment that
election officials do not oversee, there is an increased chance of voter
coercion or violation of the secret ballot. 02 In light of these dangers,
the Estonian government has established additional laws and special
voting procedures to guarantee that voters will be able to exercise
their right to a secret ballot when voting over the Internet.
dismissed the case without issuing an opinion because it determined that the
complainant had not exhausted the domestic procedures available to him. See also
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Decision of the Hum. Rts. Comm. Under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 77th Sess.,
Communication No. 1082/2002 (de Clippele v. Belgium), U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/77/D/1082/2002 (Mar. 28, 2003).
100. See NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (summarizing the
current electoral framework in Estonia and concluding that, "Estonian legislation
overall provides a sufficient framework for the conduct of democratic
elections. .. ").
101. See EESTI VARBARIIGI POHISEADUS § 60; Riigikogu Election Act, RT I
2002, 57, 355, ch. I § 1(2) ("Riigikogu elections shall be free, general, uniform
and direct. Voting shall be secret."); Local Government Council Election Act, RT I
2002, 36, 220, ch. 1 § 1(1) ("The elections of members of local government
councils [] shall be free, general, uniform and direct. Voting shall be secret."); Eur.
Par]. Election Act, RT I 2003, 4, 22, ch. 1 § 2(2) ("Elections to the European
Parliament shall be free, general, uniform and direct. Voting is secret.").
102. See Mieke Loncke & Jos Dusmortier, Online Voting: A Legal Perspective,
18 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 59, 63 (2004) (arguing that the only way to
fully guarantee that another party is not coercing a voter is to have the voter
physically present in the polling station).
AM U, INTL L. REv.
1. Estonian Laws Protect Voters Against Undue Influence or
Coercion
Estonian laws provide effective protection against voter coercion
with a two-way approach that criminalizes coercion and places a
duty on voters to keep their vote secret. The Estonian election laws
require that "a voter shall vote himself or herself."'' 0 3 This affirmative
duty protects the secrecy of the ballot because it prohibits a voter
from allowing another person to vote in his or her place. 0 4 Estonia's
laws also make it a crime to influence or coerce a voter.05 Although
Estonia's criminal laws do not specifically contemplate coercion in
the context of Internet voting, 106 the broad language of the statutes
permit the government to enforce the criminal provisions against
coercive conduct directed at Internet voters.0 7
2. The Design of the Election Provides Safeguards Against Voter
Coercion During Internet Voting
The design of Estonia's Internet election process fulfills the
ICCPR Article 25 secret ballot requirement'018 by ensuring that a third
party is not able to trace a voter to his vote. 10 9 The envelope method
used by the Estonian government allows election officials to verify
which voters have cast their ballots and makes it impossible for the
government or anyone else to connect a voter with her specific
103. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 44(1); Local
Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50(1); Eur. Parl.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 43(1).
104. See Drechsler, supra note 9, at BI (explaining how chip-based ID cards are
used to identify voters when they log online to vote).
105. See PENAL CODE § 162 (declaring that preventing a person from
participating in the electoral process is punishable by fines or imprisonment).
106. See id. § 165.
107. Cf Riigikohus [Supreme Court], Judgment of the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-13-05, 29-30
(noting that § 162 of the Estonian Penal Code, which addresses violations of the
free voting, extends to Internet elections).
108. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 70, 20 ("States should take
measures to guarantee the requirement of the secrecy of the vote during elections
.... 11).
109. See NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 8-9 (illustrating the
Intemet voting encryption process).
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ballot." ° The Estonian Internet voting system employs two separate
encryption keys-one for the voter to encrypt his ballot and another
for the election officials to decrypt the ballot. This double-encryption
method creates a secure system that protects voter privacy. 1 I
3. Voters Can Cancel Their Electronically Cast Ballots by Voting at
a Polling Place
The Estonian election laws allow a voter to go to the polling place
and recast an electronically cast ballot," 2 which provides a safeguard
in the event that another person coerced the voter or hacked into the
Internet voting system and manipulated the vote tally."3 In the event
that a voter does recast her ballot at the polling place, the ballot at the
110. See id. (discussing the positive attributes of the envelope method);
Remmert, supra note 98, at 15 (describing secrecy requirements for Internet
elections). But see Stone, supra note 1, at 979 (proposing another method of
ensuring the secret ballot while maintaining the auditability of the Internet voting
system). After voters have cast their ballots over the Internet, they would receive
numbers corresponding to the order in which they voted. Id. A local newspaper
would then print the voter number and the voter's selection, allowing voters to
know that their vote had been properly cast. Id.
11. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 88 (contending that the "envelope method" is
simple in its system architecture because it utilizes a limited number of
components); Arthur M. Keller et al., Privacy Issues for a Voting System with a
Modular Voting Architecture 8-9 (Workshop on Rating Voting Methods, June 8-9,
2006), available at http://vote.cs.gwu.edu/vsrw2006/papers/4.pdf (discussing a
prototype of an electronic voting system that could protect a voter's secret ballot
by eliminating any information in the ballot about the timing or sequence of votes
cast).
112. See Amendment Act to Local Government Council Election Act, RT I
2005, 25, 194, ch. I § 15(6) (amending Local Government Council Election Act,
RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50) (providing a means by which an Internet voter may
change his vote).
113. Cf NORWEGIAN MINISTRY, supra note 6, at 9 (recommending that, if
Norway were to implement Internet voting, the government should allow voters to
vote at a traditional polling place to cancel out an electronically cast ballot, as a
procedural safeguard to ensure that the voter casts his ballot without undue
influence); Rebekah K. Browder, Comment, Internet Voting with Initiatives and
Referendums: Stumbling Towards Direct Democracy, 29 SEATTLE UNIv. L. REV.
485, 486-87 (2005) (listing the benefits of Internet voting, including that Internet
voting allows voters to change their votes before the close of the polls on election
day).
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polling place will cancel out the electronically cast ballot."4 The
Estonian Supreme Court has held that this provision is necessary to
bring the Internet election laws into compliance with the Estonian
Constitution because it ensures that a voter who has been coerced
still has the opportunity to vote a secret ballot."5
Allowing voters to cancel out their electronically cast ballots at the
polling place is also a safeguard against an outside party influencing
the election by hacking into the voting system.' 6 Some computer
scientists assert that it is impossible to conduct an Internet election
that is one hundred percent secure because of the likelihood that
hackers will disrupt an election or manipulate votes. 17 While the
government of Estonia cannot provide a one hundred percent
guarantee against hacking," 8 this vote cancellation safeguard can
prevent such hacking from affecting final election results. In the
event that authorities find that someone has corrupted the election or
that the election officials have lost the electronic results, the
114. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 85 (asserting that the possibility of a revote
does not amount to voting twice because the system will only count one vote per
voter).
115. See Riigikohus [Supreme Court], Judgment of the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-13-05, 30
(finding that the possibility to change one's electronic vote is an "essential
supplementary guarantee to the observance of the principle of free elections"); see
also MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, app. 2 at 44-45 (reporting on the Estonian
President's challenge to the Internet voting Amendment). The Court held that
although this provision conflicted with uniformity, it was justified by the need to
allow voters to vote without being coerced. Id. at 45. "To those persons who did
not vote secretly the possibility to change one's vote gives an essential remedy for
restoring the secrecy of voting." Id.
116. See CAL. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, app. A at 37-38 (recommending that
Internet voting end before election day to prevent possible technical problems from
disenfranchising voters).
117. See, e.g., DAVID JEFFERSON ET AL., A SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SECURE
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION AND VOTING EXPERIMENT (SERVE) 3 (2004), app. D,
at 32-33, available at http://www.servesecurityreport.org/paper.pdf (concluding
that a secure election over the Internet could not be conducted due to the structure
of the Internet itself and the current design of personal computers). This evaluation
was conducted by a panel of computer scientists with an expertise in election
security for the U.S. Department of Defense's Federal Voting Assistance Program
(FVAP) Voting Over the Internet Pilot. Id.
118. Cf supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing alleged "cyber
attacks" on Estonian websites by agencies of the Russian government).
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government can instruct voters to recast their votes at a normal
polling site.' 19
B. ESTONIAN INTERNET ELECTIONS COMPLY WITH THE ICCPR
STANDARD OF EQUAL SUFFRAGE
The notion of equal suffrage contained in ICCPR Article 25(b) has
a dual meaning. It means that each voter should vote only once and
that each such vote should be weighed equally as against all other
votes. 120 To comply with ICCPR Article 25(b), a government must
ensure that its electoral procedures comply with both aspects of equal
suffrage.' 2 ' Where a state provides voting via the Internet as an
option, compliance with the latter aspect of the equal suffrage
principle becomes more difficult. Because the basic purpose of
providing the option to vote via the Internet is to encourage voter
participation by making voting more convenient, the opportunity to
vote via the Internet comes into conflict with the principle that all
voters must have an equivalent opportunity to cast their ballot. 2
Some observers argue that Internet voting frustrates equal suffrage
because it provides voters who have Internet access with twenty-four
hour access to voting, while voters who must vote at the polling
station have a limited window in which they can cast their ballot.
Critics also argue that the technology required to vote over the
Internet, such as a computer, telecommunications services, and
119. See NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 7 (stating that the NEC
has the power to nullify electronic election results, but also noting that there are no
specific criteria for this process). But see JEFFERSON ET AL., supra note 117, at 11-
12 (hypothesizing that many cyber-attacks can take place without the knowledge
of election officials).
120. See Garrone, supra note 83, at 112-13 (discussing the content of the
principle of equal suffrage under ICCPR Article 25(b)).
121. See Lilian Mitrou et al., Revisiting Legal and Regulatory Requirements for
Secure E-Voting, in SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY: VISIONS AND
PERSPECTIVES 469, 475 (Ghonaimy et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the standards for
Internet elections and stating that equal suffrage includes both the one person, one
vote standard, as well as an equal opportunity for all voters to cast their ballot).
122. See Kimberly C. Delk, Comment, What Will it Take to Produce Greater
American Voter Participation? Does Anyone Really Know?, 2 LOY. J. PUB. INT.
LAW 133, 168-70 (2001) (describing the backlash in the United States when states
introduced Internet voting, because critics believed that allowing Internet voting
would put minority voters at a disadvantage because they did not have the same
level of accessibility to computers as predominately white voters).
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special government issued ID cards, is costly and can be difficult to
obtain. 123 Some computer scientists also argue that a poorly designed
voting system would allow someone to hack into the system and
change the vote tallies or allow hackers to vote multiple times.
24
Estonia has developed an Internet voting regime that simultaneously
addresses the experts' security concerns and observes the equal
suffrage standard of ICCPR Article 25(b).
1. The Design of the Internet Election System Prevents Someone
from Voting More than One Time
The technical design of Estonia's Internet election system and
counting procedures ensure that Estonia's Internet elections do not
violate the ICCPR equal suffrage standard. In an election where
voters only vote on a paper ballot at the polling place on election
day, it is not difficult for election officials to ensure the one person
one vote standard by monitoring the voting process.'25 In this type of
election there is usually a registration process that keeps track of
which voters have already cast ballots.'26 After the voting has taken
place, election officials then compare the number of voters to the
number of ballots to ensure that there are an equal number of cast
ballots and voters.2 7 In an Internet election, where voters are
123. See NORWEGIAN MINISTRY, supra note 5, at 19-20 (discussing some of the
inequalities that Internet voting might create, such as a reluctance to vote on the
part of voters who are less competent in their use of the Internet).
124. See DoD E-VOTING ASSESSMENT, supra note 81, at 4-31 to 4-33
(concluding that the U.S. Dept. of Defense should not implement Internet voting
because of the many security risks involved in Internet voting, including computer
attacks and vote manipulation).
125. See General Comment No. 25, supra note 70, 20 (explaining that ICCPR
Art. 25(b) requires an independent electoral authority to supervise the electoral
process); Loncke & Dusmortier, supra note 102, at 63 (stating that existing
technology does not permit an electronic voting system to verify voter identity
with 100 percent accuracy); Larson, supra note 125, at 1806 (explaining that
attendance at a polling station, rather than voting online, allows an election official
to verify the voter's identity in person).
126. See, e.g., ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Overview of Voter
Registration (Sept. 8, 2006), http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/vr/vrlO (providing
a summary of the voter registration process and some of the goals of the process,
including ensuring that each citizen only votes one time).
127. See Thad Hall, Vote Counting and Recounting: Existing Practices and Best
Practices, Remarks at the U.S. Election Assistance Commission 5-6 (Apr. 14,
2006), available at http://www.eac.gov/News/meetings/042006/ploneexfile.2006-
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completing the voting process through a website, complying with
this standard can be more complicated because there is no election
official physically present when a person casts a ballot and because
there is no physical ballot to use during a recount. 21
In Estonia, only voters holding ID cards may vote over the
Internet. 29 This requirement creates documentation regarding the
names of eligible voters and adds a layer of security because it
restricts the number of people having access to the voting system to
eligible, ID card-carrying voters. 30  This requirement is not
discriminatory because the government requires all Estonian citizens
to obtain the card and, to date, most eligible voters have obtained the
card.' 3
Estonian election procedures require that election officials
compare the list of voters who voted online with a list of voters who
voted at the polling place prior to initiating the vote tally at the end
06-26.9329203538/attachmentdownload/file (discussing the voting process in the
United States and commenting that other nations have a requirement that the
number of people who voted must equal the number of ballots).
128. See CALTECH/MIT REPORT, supra note 95, at 10 (maintaining that any
voting that takes place outside the polling place, such as absentee voting, carries a
strong chance of voter fraud). But see Bryan Mercurio, Democracy in Decline:
Can Internet Voting Save the Electoral Process?, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 409, 439-40 (2004) (arguing that voting over the Internet reduces the
occurrence of illegally voting more than once by requiring voter identification
when voters log into a website).
129. See Riigikogu Election Act, RT 1 2002, 57, 355, ch. 7 § 44; Local
Government Council Election Act, RT I 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7 § 50; Eur. Parl.
Election Act, RT 1 2003, 4, 22, ch. 7 § 43. But see R6publique et Canton de
Gen~ve, supra note 4 (explaining that the Geneva voting system does not require
the connection of any peripheral components to the voter's personal computer).
The state mails voters a voting card that has a personal identification number that
the voter uses to identify herself when she casts a ballot online. Id.
130. See Rpublique et Canton de Gen~ve, supra note 4 (describing the process
of encoding a unique picture into the ballot through a voter's ID to provide
additional protection).
130. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 85 (describing how the ID cards limit who
may access the system to only those eligible to vote).
131. See id. (reporting on the many different transactions in which Estonians can
use their ID cards and that Estonian law identifies the ID card as a legal means of
identification in transactions over the Internet).
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of an election. 3 2 If one individual appears on both lists, the officials
cancel the electronic vote to prevent anyone from voting twice.'33
Although voters may change their vote as many times as they wish,
the system prevents multiple votes.'34
2. Citizens Voting over the Internet Do Not Have an Advantage over
Voters Voting a Paper Ballot
Estonia complies with the second equal suffrage component of the
ICCPR Article 25(b) standard because voters in Estonia who utilize
the Internet to cast their ballot do not have a substantial advantage
over voters who vote using a paper ballot.3 5 Some experts argue that
the ability to vote with a home computer makes the voting process
inherently more accessible and gives those voters who vote
electronically a longer time period in which to cast their ballot. 3 6
Critics also assert that the Internet voting option is an unfair
advantage because Internet voters have the opportunity to re-vote
later at a polling site, while voters attending a normal polling place
only have one chance to make their voting decision. 3 ' Additionally,
experts argue that Internet voting is unequal when there is a "digital
132. See NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 7 (describing the
procedures in place for electronically sorting cast ballots and then canceling out the
duplicate ballot if the voter also voted at the polling place).
133. See id.
134. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 86 (explaining that one of the important
principles of Internet voting is the opportunity for voters to recast their ballot, and,
because the system will only register one vote per voter, this does not constitute
voting multiple times).
135. See Garrone, supra note 83, at 114 (noting that because Internet voting
adds an additional manner in which voters can cast their ballots, governments must
ensure electronic voting is accessible to voters in practical terms as well as in terms
of the voters' capacity to understand and utilize the method provided).
136. See id. (reasoning that to ensure equality, governments should offer voters
the opportunity to cast their ballots electronically in public spaces so as not to
discriminate against voters who do not have access to a computer at their home or
work).
137. See Loncke & Dusmortier, supra note 102, at 59, 62 (recommending that
governments adopting the Internet voting option should equalize access by
extending the time period for voting for all voting methods and placing remote
voting terminals in public places such as libraries, grocery stores, and post offices).
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divide"'138 in society, which occurs when certain demographics do not
have equal access to the technology needed to vote electronically. 39
To compound the problem, a "digital divide" could also violate
ICCPR Article 2, which requires States Parties to the ICCPR to
administer the requirements of the ICCPR non-discriminatorily. 4 °
Estonia's Internet elections withstand these criticisms. In Estonia,
the opportunity to vote over the Internet is restricted to the fourth
through the sixth day before the election.' 4 ' Because voters may still
go to early voting sites and vote during this time, voting over the
Internet does not offer Internet voters a special time advantage. 142
138. See, e.g., Brett Stohs, Is I- Voting I-Llegal?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV.
13, 15 (2003) (listing the factors that may effect Internet availability and
illustrating the shrinking division among groups).
139. See id. (providing statistics illustrating the difference between socio-
economic and racial groups' access to Internet technology in the United States);
Larson, supra note 116, at 1814-15 (summarizing a case brought in United States
District Court against the Arizona Democratic Party when it held its primary over
the Internet). The Voting Integrity Project, along with an African-American man
and a Hispanic woman, brought the lawsuit asserting that the election was
discriminatory under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, claiming that all citizens did
not have equal access to the Internet. Id.; see KEVIN COLEMAN, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICES, INTERNET VOTING 5-6 (2003) (reporting that the District
Court decided not to grant the injunction that the Voting Integrity Project had
sought).
140. See ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 2 (prohibiting states from discriminating
due to "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status"). But see John T. Nockleby, Why
Internet Voting, 34 Loy. L. REV. 1023, 1025-26 (reasoning that Internet voting
might enhance political equality because it would eliminate obstacles for certain
groups that have difficulty in getting to a polling place on election day, such as the
elderly and disabled).
141. See Local Government Council Election Act, RT 1 2002, 36, 220, ch. 7
§ 44 (detailing the two time periods for advance electronic and non-electronic
voting).
142. See Riigikohus [Supreme Court], Judgment of the Constitutional Review
Chamber of the Supreme Court, Constitutional Judgment 3-4-1-13-05, 22-24
(holding that the actual inequality of individuals in terms of personal access to the
Internet does not constitute inequality in the sense of the Estonian constitutional
principle of equal treatment because the Estonian government has enacted
legislation that enables all individuals to use Internet voting). But see Nadja Braun,
E-Voting: Switzerland's Projects and Their Legal Framework - In a European
Context, in ELECTRONIC VOTING IN EUROPE: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, POLITICS AND
SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 43, 47 (stating that Geneva's experimental Internet
voting system permits voting as early as three weeks prior to the election and ends
the day before the election closes).
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The availability of computers with the ID card-reader in multiple
public places allows individuals who do not have a computer at
home to take advantage of this voting option. 143 Moreover, the
"digital divide" in Estonia is not as great as in other states. 144 The
government of Estonia has made it a priority to promote access to the
Internet and it has one of the highest rates of Internet access of any
former Soviet Republic.1 45
C. ESTONIAN INTERNET ELECTIONS COMPLY WITH THE ICCPR
STANDARD OF AUDITABILITY
The government of Estonia developed the Internet voting system
to be as straightforward and transparent as possible. 46 The system's
auditing capacity permits verification of voting data by a third party
and thus facilitates this transparency and contributes to voter
confidence.'47  Taken together, these factors demonstrate that
Estonia's Internet voting system complies with the election
auditability requirement of ICCPR Article 25.
Auditing Internet elections can be particularly difficult because the
technology used is not readily accessible to election observers. This
is a consequence of the logistics of the Internet voting system,
143. See Garrone, supra note 83, at 114 (suggesting that one way governments
could lessen the inherent inequality in Internet voting is to make computers for e-
voting available to the public that voters can use outside normal business hours).
144. See Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number of Internet Users in
Estonia up by 79,000, ESTONIAN REV., Sept. 7, 2005, http://www.vm.ee/eng
/kat_137/6945.html (reporting that one in four Estonians use the Internet on a daily
basis and that there was an increase in users having lower incomes and living in
larger cities).
145. See Ray, supra note 24 (reporting that sixty percent of Estonians stated that
they have a computer in their home and fifty-two percent say that they have
Internet access at home). The Riigikogu passed a bill in February of 2000 that
makes access to the Internet a constitutional right for Estonians. See Colin
Woodard, Estonia, Where Being Wired is a Human Right, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 1, 2003, at 7 (reporting that in 2000 the Riigikogu made Internet
access a human right). The government has embarked on a large-scale project to
make the Internet more accessible. See id.
146. See Maaten, supra note 44, at 86 (explaining that one way that the Estonian
government simplified the Internet voting process was to make it similar to the
normal voting process).
147. See NATIONAL ELECTION COMMITTEE, supra note 35, at 16-17 (detailing
the system's auditing capabilities). The system creates logs of voter activity on the
system at numerous stages in the Internet voting process. See id.
376 [23:349
2008] WHEN COMPUTERS TRANSFORM INTO BALLOT BOXES
whereby the voters' home computers and the central servers that
collect the voting data are dispersed throughout the country. 48
Compounding the problem of election observation is the fact that the
Internet voting process itself takes place in a variety of
environments, where observers are unable to monitor the voter's
polling experience.149 It is thus exceedingly difficult for a single
election observer to oversee simultaneously the process of voting,
where coercion may occur, and the process of vote collection, where
fraud may occur.'50
1. Estonia Has Made the Software that Drives Its Election Systems
Available to the Public, Facilitating Auditing of the Internet Voting
Process
One of the most important technological components in an
Internet election is the software that counts and stores the votes. 5'
The software used in the Estonian Internet election is Linux-based,
148. See generally id. at 9-10 (discussing Internet voting system architecture).
149. See NORWEGIAN MINISTRY, supra note 5, at 22 (explaining two different
types of voting, one where voters are in a controlled environment and the other
where the voters are in an uncontrolled environment, and noting that Internet
voting is part of the latter category).
150. Cf LAWRENCE NORDEN ET AL., POST-ELECTION AUDITS: RESTORING
TRUST IN ELECTIONS 31 (2007) (comparing the election audit provisions of various
states in the United States). Norden points out that New York law permits a single
party to appoint an observer to oversee polling stations as well as an observer to
oversee the selection of polling machines for audit. See id. See generally ACE
Electoral Knowledge Network, Guiding Principles of Vote Counting,
http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/vr/vrlO (last visited Mar. 1, 2007) (outlining
some of the standards for vote counting and noting that if votes are counted
electronically it is important to have an independent audit of the counting process).
151. See Jay Lyman, Canada Marks First Internet Election in North America,
TECHNEWSWORLD, Oct. 11, 2003, http://www.technewsworld.com/story/32098
.html (discussing the debate about the security of the various types of software that
could be used to support Internet voting); Jay Lyman, Open Source Election
Systems Desirable, Unavailable, NEWSFORGE, THE ONLINE NEWSPAPER FOR
LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE, Mar. 6, 2006, http://trends.newsforge.com
/article.pl?sid=06/02/28/1648218&tid=136 (suggesting that the use in an election
of software containing privately owned code leads to a lack of trust and
transparency). However, some experts maintain that the ownership of the
underlying rights to the voting software is less important than the ability to inspect
the source code, as the software may be provided for inspection regardless of who
holds the intellectual property rights. See id.
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which has a source code that is open to the public.'52 Open source
software makes it easier for the public and observers to access the
software and check for vulnerabilities.'53 Supporters of election
reform have also lauded open-source software because it increases
transparency in the voting process and makes independent testing of
the election software straightforward.'54
Before Estonia held its 2005 election, the NEC 5 5 tested the
electoral system and an independent outside expert reviewed the
source code. 56 Although this was not an entirely open process, 57 it
still provided a level of security to ensure that the software was going
152. See ELECTION MISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 11-12 (detailing the
technical specifications of the various components of Estonia's Internet voting
system and the type of software that each component utilizes); Sean Dunne, Case
Study: Information Technology: Elections and Technology, in ELECTORAL
MANAGEMENT DESIGN: THE INTERNATIONAL IDEA HANDBOOK 240, 243, 246
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2006), available at
http://www.idea.int/publications/emd/upload/EMD inlay-final.pdf
(recommending that to ensure security in an Internet election, governments should
have ownership of the code on which the election software is based); WATT, supra
note 73, at 18, 32-33 (noting that an additional benefit to using open-source code is
that in the event a technology supplier is no longer able to provide the government
with equipment, the government would be able to have the equipment
manufactured by another company).
153. See CALTECH/MIT REPORT, supra note 95, at 46-47 (listing
recommendations for electronic voting, including that all vote counting and
recording software should be open source and non-proprietary); Editorial, Making
Democracy Credible, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, at A18 (reporting that trust in the
voting system in the United States is undermined when private companies maintain
the secrecy of software code used in the counting of electronic ballots).
154. See generally Testimony on Source Code Disclosure: Hearing on H.R. 811
Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H. Comm. On Admin., 110th Cong.,
(2007) (statement of David Wagner, Computer Science Division, University of
California, Berkeley), available at www.cs.berkeley.edu/-daw/papers/testimony-
house07.pdf [hereinafter Source Code Testimony] (summarizing the benefits of
using open source software and suggesting that software companies would benefit
from adopting the use of open source code in their voting technology).
155. See NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-4 (describing the role
of the NEC as a non-partisan professional group that administers elections in
Estonia).
156. See id. at 6 (describing the steps that the NEC has taken to develop and test
the Internet voting system). The OSCE Mission noted that the NEC has not
conducted additional testing, however, and the system itself is not subject to any
certification requirements. See id.
157. See id. (noting that the NEC hired an outside expert to review the system
source code).
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to work properly.'58 Before the March 2007 election, the Estonian
government hired an outside consulting company to audit Estonia's
voting technology and the auditors found no problems.'59
Additionally, one computer expert has noted that Estonia's small
population may detract hackers from attempting to foil an election in
the country because hackers usually focus on events that will affect
many people, giving them more notoriety. 60
2. Estonia's Voting Procedures Require Auditing of the Internet
Election Process
Election observers in Estonia have the opportunity to review the
source code and the architecture of the electoral system, which is
essential for a thorough audit of an election with Internet voting. 6' In
Internet elections, observers still have the same goals as they do in a
paper ballot election, but their specific duties are different. 162
Observers likely will need technical expertise to identify flaws in an
Internet election. 163
158. See Loncke & Dusmortier, supra note 102, at 66-67 (acknowledging that
making source code available to citizens would increase voter confidence, but also
makes the election system more vulnerable to hackers). Loncke and Dusmortier
suggest that a compromise solution would be to have the open source code only
available to a certain group of experts or the electoral administration body. Id.
159. See Borland, supra note 24 (reporting that the multinational auditing firm
KPMG completed a review of the Internet voting technology and that observers
from political parties observed the auditing).
160. See Anne Broache, Estonia Pioneers Internet Voting, WEBWATCH, Oct. 18,
2005, http://networks.silicon.com/webwatch/0,39024667,39153422,00.htm
(praising the success of Estonia's Internet elections and noting that election
officials did not observe any glitches or suspect any hacking attempts).
161. See NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 (reporting that the
NEC made all aspects of the election system open to political parties and observers
and that a training for these groups was slated for February 12, 2007, prior to the
2007 Parliamentary elections). The goal of the training is to familiarize observers
with procedures such as installing the software, testing the electronic tallying
software, transporting the servers, and generating the encryption keys. Id.
162. See Szep, supra note 6, at 33 (noting that the primary difference for
observers of Internet elections is that while they are unable to conduct on-the-spot
inspections of the system software, they are still able to inspect items such as
system certificates and system architecture to ensure that the domestic electoral
authorities have met national and international standards).
163. See generally Robert Krimmer & Melanie Volkamer, Observing Threats to
Voter's Anonymity: Election Observation of Electronic Voting 12 (Competence
Center for Electronic Voting and Participation, Working Paper Nr. 0 1/2006, 2006),
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Estonia's process enables observers to view the entire election
process. Before the 2005 elections, the Estonian government invited
political parties and other interested organizations to a training on
observing Internet elections. 64 The OSCE did not note any problems
with access to viewing election procedures in its assessment of
Estonia's March 4, 2007 Parliamentary elections. 165
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite their success, Estonia's elections remain an experiment in
a relatively new field. The Estonian government should thus
continually improve its Internet voting system. It appears that
electronic voting is going to become a voting option in many states
in the coming years in spite of the absence of widely recognized
international guidelines for Internet elections. 66 The international
community should respond to this need and develop a set of
standards for Internet elections. Additionally, at the national level,
Estonia's government should strengthen its laws and procedures
available at http://www.e-voting.cc/files/Working-Paper-1-2006/ (providing an
overview of observers' tasks during elections that employ internet voting). The
observer should ensure that the system prevents unauthorized access to the server
that records votes and encrypts voters' data. Id. But see VOLLAN, supra note 95, at
16 (cautioning against any technical assessment by observers that the public might
construe as certification of the voting equipment, which should not be the
responsibility of the observers, but rather the government and electoral
management body).
164. See MADISE ET AL., supra note 12, at 21 (explaining that the participants
were introduced to the required documentation for Internet voting during the
training). The Estonian government also offered foreign officials the opportunity to
observe the Internet voting in two different cities. Id. at 21-22.
165. See NEEDS ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 13, at 6 (noting that few
Estonian political parties focused their efforts on election observation missions
despite the fact that the NEC permitted interested parties to observe
implementation of the new Internet voting systems).
166. See Shari Claire Lewis, Internet Voting: Validity, Safety Issues Must Be
Addressed to Reach Full Potential, 236 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5-6 (Aug. 1, 2006) (describing
the New York Firefighters Union's use of online voting for election of union
officials and a thwarted plan to offer online voting to members of the military
stationed abroad). But see Operational and Technical Standards for E-Voting,
supra note 66, at 23-29 (suggesting standards for Internet voting for European
Union ("EU") Member States and calling on EU Member States to conduct
evaluations of their procedures for Internet voting and report their findings to the
Council of Europe).
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pertaining to the ICCPR requirements of auditability and equal
suffrage. By addressing these concerns, Estonia will become an even
better model for states that are implementing Internet elections.
A. THE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD CREATE AN OPTIONAL
PROTOCOL TO THE ICCPR THAT SETS OUT GUIDELINES FOR
CONDUCTING INTERNET ELECTIONS
As states venture into the new territory of Internet elections, it will
become increasingly more important for the international community
to establish procedural and technical standards for Internet
elections. 67 The creation of an ICCPR Optional Protocol containing
standards for Internet voting could resolve this problem. 68 An
Optional Protocol would be an effective solution because the ICCPR
is already one of the most widely recognized guidelines for
elections. 69 An Optional Protocol would assist election observers
and governments by outlining criteria with which a state must
abide. 70  Additionally, this would assist states interested in
implementing Internet elections by allowing them to know what the
standards are as they develop a new system.'7'
167. See Julia A. Glidden, Election Monitoring, Technology and the Promotion
of Democracy: A Case for International Standards, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 364-66
(2001) (explaining that one of the problems surrounding Internet voting is the lack
of international technical standards).
168. Cf Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders On, Or Borders Around- The Future
of the Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH. 343, 344, 373-81 (2006) (recommending
a convention modeled on the ICCPR and the United Nations Human Rights
Convention to regulate defamation over the Internet because it would be the most
efficient way to regulate due to the "borderlessness" of the Internet).
169. See Jeremy Grace, External and Absentee Voting in CHALLENGING THE
NORMS AND STANDARDS OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 35, 37 (International
Foundation for Election Systems 2007), available at http://www.ifes.org/
publication/e5c04c69e4ee902399d9f63245f99b0e/IFES%20Challenging%20Electi
on%20Norms%20and%2OStandards%20WP.pdf (maintaining that many other
human rights instruments replicate the language of the ICCPR).
170. See ELECTION MISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 10 (recommending that
the Riigikogu codify further regulations on the security requirements for Internet
elections).
171. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the
Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 149, 184-86 (2001) (arguing
that any international standards that are created to govern the use of technology
must be inherently flexible because the fast changing nature of technology could
well conflict with the slow pace at which international law ordinarily evolves).
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
The Optional Protocol should create an advisory body of computer
scientists that will evaluate the technological systems proposed by
states.1 2 The scientists could use the factors set out in the protocol to
make their decisions. Having an independent body evaluate election
technology will increase trust in Internet voting systems and could
allay the public's fears that a government might misuse the voting
technology, which is under the government's control, to manipulate
elections in favor of particular constituencies. 17 3
The Optional Protocol could also facilitate the prosecution of
election-related cyber crimes. Because it is not geographically
delimited, the Internet has created jurisdictional complications in
many areas of criminal law. 174 Even where a state has enacted
criminal statutes with respect to certain conduct, such as voter
coercion or election fraud, such statutes can be impossible to enforce
when the perpetrator or the conduct are located in another
jurisdiction. 75 An international instrument that facilitates cross-
border prosecution of such activity will greatly lessen incentives for
the commission of cyber-crime and disruption of elections.1 76
172. See CALTECH/I4T REPORT, supra note 95, at 47 (recommending that the
United States create a national commission of information security experts to
develop voting equipment software); Picker, supra note 189, at 185-86
(recommending that one way for international law to keep up with fast changing
technology is for an international organization to oversee the rules).
173. See Council of Eur., Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation of the
Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Legal, Operational and Technical
Standards for E-Voting, i-iii, 898th Sess., Doc. No. Rec(2004)11
(recommending legal and technical standards for electronic and Internet voting in
Europe and calling on EU Member State governments to evaluate their voting
systems and report on their evaluations to the Council of Europe).
174. See Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Which States May Regulate the Internet, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117,
119-25 (1997) (describing the evolution of the regulation of the Internet and an
analysis of the different means under international law that states have tried to use
when prosecuting international crimes).
175. See id.
176. See Ryan P. Wallace et al., Computer Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 223,
272-74 (Spring 2005) (asserting that cyber-crime is difficult for states to prosecute
because the Internet does not have a geographic boundary and recommending that
the international community create a functional international legal framework to
deter cross-border criminal conduct).
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B. ESTONIA SHOULD ENACT SUPPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION THAT
PROHIBITS VOTING AT WORK TO BOLSTER ITS ELECTION
SYSTEM'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ICCPR
Estonia should place restrictions on the locations from which
voters may cast online ballots. Such restrictions would enhance the
secret ballot element of the Internet voting system and reinforce the
secret ballot standards of the ICCPR. 77 Because many of the fears of
undue influence often involve voting that might occur in a voter's
work place,'78 Estonia should make it a crime to vote at work and
also require employers to block the NEC website from workplace
computers. 17 9
The workplace is one of the places where a voter could easily face
intimidation. 8 ° By forcing voters to use a personal or public
computer instead of a company computer, there is less likelihood that
an employer could find out how a voter voted and therefore less
chance of retaliation. Other states have acknowledged the special
potential for coercion that exists in the employer-employee
relationship in the context of voting and have enacted legislation to
protect voters. 8' Estonia should do the same.
177. See ICCPR, supra note 11, art. 25.
178. Cf Lisa Bingham, Employee Free Speech in the Workplace: Using the
First Amendment as Public Policy for Wrongful Discharge Actions, 55 OHIO ST.
L.J. 341, 352-53 (1994) (explaining that numerous states in the United States have
legislation that penalizes employers that coerce employees in connection with
employee voting).
179. See Loncke & Dusmortier, supra note 102, at 64-65 (arguing that the only
way to guarantee against coercion of voters is to have voting take place in a
controlled environment such as a polling place, and that Internet voting outside of
such controlled environments should be regulated by laws that deal with the
potentiality of coercion). Cf NORWEGIAN MINISTRY, supra note 5, at 91
(acknowledging that when voting takes place in uncontrolled environments outside
the polling place, it is difficult to ensure that the transaction will be secure).
180. See CAL. TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 40 (recommending that California
consider amendments to election laws to penalize employers who monitor or
intimidate their employees' online voting in the workplace). Cf Mercurio, supra
note 128, at 434-35 (analogizing the potential for voter coercion in Internet voting
with similar opportunities for coercion in absentee balloting).
181. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (1982) (providing that a voter's employer,
agents of a voter's employer, and agents of the voter's labor union are prohibited
from providing assistance to a voter in the voting booth-other parties may
provide assistance to the voter upon the voter's request).
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C. THE NEC SHOULD CREATE A PROCEDURE FOR ELECTION
OBSERVERS AT INTERNET ELECTIONS TO FACILITATE AUDITING
Observers are an integral part of the election process.1 82 They help
to ensure the integrity of the voting process and instill public trust in
the election results. 83 Creating a uniform list of procedures for
observers will make the electoral system more transparent and will
permit Estonia to maintain uniform records of its elections.1 84 These
procedures could take several different forms, such as a checklist of
inquiries observers should make during their observation mission.'85
Such a list of procedures will also facilitate independent auditing of
the election because it will enable the observers to generate a
coherent data set that later can be examined to assess the quality of
the election system in various regions. 8 6 Clearly, observation
procedures that are tailored to a state's unique political and electoral
environment are much more effective than generic procedures. 87
The Estonian National Elections Commission could structure the
checklist in several ways. One way would be to list the different
steps in the Internet voting process, with corresponding questions for
182. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of election observation and the manner in which it reinforces the auditability of an
election).
183. See id.
184. See VOLLAN, supra note 95, at 3-4 (noting the important role observers
must play in ensuring accurate and trustworthy electronic elections, especially in
transitioning countries where the electorate already generally distrusts the
government).
185. See, e.g., Verified Voting Foundation, Local Election Administration
Voting Technology Full Questionnaire (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.verifiedvoting
foundation.org/article.php?id=6 151 (directing observers of elections utilizing
technology to analyze issues such as the testing of the equipment, information
about the vendors of the equipment, and the accessibility of the equipment).
186. See ELECTION MISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 1, 10, 16 (recommending
that the election software be subject to a more comprehensive security audit, that
an independent body conduct the audit in accordance with published benchmarks,
and that the final audit reports be publicly available).
187. See INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, THE
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTORAL OBSERVATION: LESSONS LEARNED AND
RECOMMENDATIONS: CONFERENCE REPORT 12 (1999) (cautioning that observation
questionnaires that are not tailored to the particular country where the observer is
monitoring can cause confusion and lead to an inaccurate assessment of the
election).
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each period,'88 while another way might involve listing primary areas
of concern with respect to Estonia's Internet voting regime, with
corresponding inquiries that the observer would be instructed to
make during the mission.'89 The list below employs the latter
method, focusing on two main areas: assessing the laws and
procedures in place to govern Internet elections and assessing voters'
perceptions of the election itself.
Proper inquiries for the observer regarding the laws and
procedures governing Internet elections might include:
" Have the National Election Commission (NEC) and local
election officials complied with the required procedure for
counting ballots? 90
" Has the NEC made the election software code available for
review, if not to the public at least to political parties and
experts?' 9'
" Do procedures exist for the testing of election technology by a
third party? If there are such procedures, has auditing taken
place? 192
Proper inquiries to make of voters might include:
" How much trust do you have in the NEC? 193
" Do you know of any segments of the population that election
officials have discriminated against, or who have difficulty
voting? 194
188. See generally OFFICE FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS, ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, ELECTION
OBSERVATION HANDBOOK (5th ed. 2005), available at http://www.osce.org/
item/14004.html?ch=240 (outlining responsibilities for observers on OSCE
missions into sections based on the phases of the election-pre-election phase,
election phase, immediate post-election phase, and extended post-election phase).
189. Cf id. ann. B at 86-88 (giving an example of an election observer's
checklist organized by steps in the electoral process).
190. Cf id. at 61-64 (describing the necessary aspects of a legitimate counting
procedure in traditional elections).
191. Cf. id. at 37-45 (emphasizing the importance of impartiality and openness
in election administration meetings).
192. Cf. id. at 43 (recommending that the OSCE review the ballot printing and
security procedures prior to the administration of a traditional election).
193. Cf id. at 56 (suggesting that election observers assess voters' confidence in
the election).
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* Did you find it easy to vote via the Internet? If not, was
sufficient assistance available to you when you encountered
difficulties?'95
CONCLUSION
While many states are interested in implementing voting over the
Internet, 196 Estonia is one of the first states to make Internet voting
possible on a large scale in a binding election. 197 As technology
changes in elections, states should still adhere to the ICCPR because
the principles contained therein continue to provide a solid
foundation for the dual values of equal suffrage in the context of
voting via the internet. Estonian legislation and the design of its
Internet voting system succeeds in maintaining compliance with the
basic principles of the ICCPR. As more states begin to augment their
electoral systems with the Internet voting option, Estonia's model
should serve as a guiding light.' 98
194. Cf id. at 41-42 (recommending that observers note where discrimination is
apparent in the voter registration process).
195. Cf id. at 56 (directing an election observer to discuss a voter's impression
of the secrecy of his or her ballot when doubt regarding the confidentiality of
voters' choices exists).
196. See, e.g., Jessica M. Natale, Exploring Virtual Legal Presence: The Present
and the Promise, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 157, 166-67 (2002) (discussing the
preliminary efforts that a number of U.S. states, Sweden, and the UK have made in
exploring online voting); Michael Odell Walker, Note, "'Don't Show Them Where
to Click and Vote: " An Assessment of Electioneering Law in the United States as a
Consideration in Implementing Internet Voting Regimes, 91 KY. L.J. 715, 728
(2002-2003) (describing online voting initiatives in Canada, Britain, Switzerland,
Ireland and Estonia).
197. See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
198. See Drechsler, supra note 9, at BI (reviewing the results and lessons of
Estonia's first online election and praising the idea as a model for future nations to
follow); Robin O'Brien Lynch, Estonia Takes the Lead in Online Voting, THE
IRISH TIMES, Oct. 21, 2005, at 7 (comparing favorably the smooth Estonian online
voting process against the problems Ireland has experienced with its traditional
voting methods).
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